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Abstract 
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan since 2003 is 
the largest producer of illicit opium in the world. In 2011, it produced 5,800 metric tons of 
opium from approximately 131,000 hectors cultivated land – an increase from its lowest 
production level of 200 metric tons in 2001. The resurgence of opium poppy in Afghanistan 
seriously undermines the post-2001 progress in rebuilding Afghanistan and contributes to the 
on-going insurgency. A combination of external, internal, political and economic factors have 
contributed to this resurgence of the Afghan Opium Industry. These factors, among others, 
include insecurity, poverty, corruption, lack of agricultural subsidies and lack of alternative 
livelihoods, unemployment, lawlessness, and poor infrastructure.   
The Afghan government and its international allies have been fighting the illicit drugs in 
Afghanistan post-2001. Various policies have been applied but no positive sustainable reduction 
has been achieved so far. This thesis proposes/argues that decentralizing governmental 
authority over narcotic production and management from the national to sub-national level 
would be more effective in curbing the illicit opium industry of Afghanistan.Specifically, this 
research will examine the nature and root causes of the opium poppy cultivation and 
production, trafficking and consumption,the past and current policies and their implication, and 
successful cases of decentralized approaches. 
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Chapter One 
 Introduction: 
 It has been ten years since the Taliban regime has been removedAfghanistan after the 
2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. There are promising signs of development in a nation that 
has suffered from nearly three decades of conflict, destruction, and despair. Toppling the 
extremist regime of the Taliban paved the way for rebuilding Afghanistan as a democratic state. 
Presidential elections have been held twice, a constitution has been adopted, and the country 
has a democratically elected parliament and an independent judiciary system. Millions of 
children returned to school thereby improving the literacy with each passing year. Every year 
hundreds of thousands of student are enrolled in national universities and private higher 
studies institution throughout the country. Afghanistan currently has approximately 305,600 
national security forces comprising 171,600 national army and 134,000 national Police.  
 Despite these developments, President Hamid Karzai’s government in Kabul faces a 
multitude of political, security, and economic challenges. Insecurity, corruption, poverty, 
lawlessness, and booming illicit opium poppy cultivation and production are amongst the 
challenges that the Afghan government and its international allies must overcome to ensure a 
stable democratic Afghanistan. From among these many challenges, the illicit opium industry is 
the prime focus of this thesis. The Afghan opium kills more than 100,000 people each year 
globally -more than any other drug. According to the UN Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) 
2011 report on the Afghan opiate trade, heroin annually kills five times as many people in NATO 
countries than the total number of troops killed in Afghanistan from 2001-2009.  About 16.5 
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million people around the world use heroin, opium, or morphine. Trade in Afghan opiate is also 
very profitable, generating $61 billion out of the total opiate trade of $68 billion in 2009.  Of the 
$61 billion, Afghan traffickers received only $2.2 billion or 3.6%, with Afghan farmers receiving 
less than 0.7% or $ 450-500 million.  Traffickers and farmers are not the only ones to benefit 
from poppy production.  Between 2004 and 2008, the Taliban raised $450 million to $600 
million by taxing Afghanopium farmers and traffickers –a significant portion of their operating 
expenses.1 
In 2010, Afghanistan produced 3,600 metric tons (mt) of the global total of 4,860 mt of 
opium.  The following year, Afghan production increased 61% to 5,800 mt. After the fall of the 
Taliban, the Afghan government, as had several other governments afflicted by illicit drugs, 
turned to international allies for assistance in launching counter-narcotics efforts.  In 2003, the 
Afghan government formulated a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) with four national 
priorities of (a) - Disrupting the drug trade by targeting the traffickers and their backers (b) - 
Strengthening and diversifying legal alternative livelihoods (c) - Reducing the demand for illicit 
drugs and treatment of problem drug users, and (d) - Developing state institutions at the center 
and provincial level vital to the delivery of counter narcotics strategy. In line with this strategy’s 
priorities, supplementary policies such as interdiction and law enforcement, eradication, and 
provision of agricultural subsidies were initiated. In 2005, the Ministry of Counter Narcotics 
(MCN) was established. The ministry is responsible for the coordination, evaluation, 
management, and implementation of Counter Narcotics law and NDCS.The international 
                                                          
1 United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), “ Global Afghan Opiate Trade, 2011”, 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf 
and, u UNODC, “World Drug Report, 2011”, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf (accessed, March 16, 2012) 
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communityprovided the Afghan government with financial, technical, and logistical assistance. 
Despite the efforts of the Afghan government and its international partners there has been no 
significant sustainable reduction in Afghan opium cultivation, production and trafficking.  
 This thesis argues that the government’s failure to reduce opium production lies, not in 
its strategy and sub-policies, but in the government’s decision to implement these policies from 
the central governmental level. The problem is the centralistic approach of the government. 
Beginning in 2003, the Afghan government adopted a highly-centralized approach to combat 
narcotics production - an approach that is opposite to the diversity and decentralized nature of 
the Afghan opium cultivation and production. It is the central government that has formulated 
counter-narcotic policies and strategies, applying laws and programs indiscriminately to all 
poppy cultivating provinces.  This centralized approach has failed for two primary reasons.  A 
uniform policy approach fails to recognize the different reasons and motivations that farmers in 
various provinces grow poppies, and is thereby unable to tailor counter policies effectively.  
Second, the center’s orientation towards implementing policies, is to by-pass the local 
institutions and authorities, thereby failing to engage those most responsible and active in 
narcotics production. This thesis argues that the authority for the planning, management, and 
implementation of counter-narcotics efforts must be decentralized from the central 
government to the sub-national level or governor’s level if Afghanistan is to effectively curb the 
illicit opium industry. In other words, a decentralized approach is the most effective method for 
tackling the diverse and decentralized Afghan opium industry. 
 This analyses and research is formulated in the following format. In Chapter Two, a 
historical background of Afghanistan’s politics and government structure along with the 
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Afghanopium industry is discussed. Chapter Three examines in more detail the factors that 
have contributed to the expansion, cultivation, and production of the Afghan opium industry 
from historical times to post-2001. Chapter Four first analyzes current policies to counter 
narcotic’s production, and then concludes by examining how these policies have failed to 
produce sufficient results. 
Finally, Chapter Five is designated to the argument of the thesis. The chapter defines 
decentralization of power in general, and discusses its types and arrangements, and then 
applies a decentralized governmental structure to Afghanistan and examines the effectiveness 
of this arrangement on the Afghan opium industry. The Chapter ends with a conclusion. 
Research Question, Methodology, and Significance: 
 The Research Question of this thesis is: How would the decentralization of power in 
Afghanistan affect opium poppy cultivation and production?  
 The methodology used in this research is of an inter-disciplinary qualitative nature, drawing 
from several disciplines, including Political Science, International Studies, Economics, and 
Agriculture. Primary and secondary literature including national, international, and non-
governmental organizations’ (NGO) studies and reports, peer reviewed journal articles and 
books, and news articles will be analyzed. The literature is drawn from national and 
International NGO’s and governmental websites, academic database such Google Scholar, and 
Pro-Quest, international and local news sources, other legitimate sources of relevant literature 
and data, and interviews.  This thesis will explore the successful cases of decentralized counter-
narcotics initiatives, the diverse and decentralized nature of the Afghan opium cultivation and 
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production, and how a decentralized approach can establish better coordination and 
cooperation between various institutions involved in the war against opium in Afghanistan. 
A wide variety of academic audience may be interested and enriched by this research, 
including political science, international and globalization studies, peace and conflict studies, 
business, history, and military and security studies.  Policy makers, the Counter Narcotics 
Ministry of Afghanistan, the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Provincial Governors 
in Afghanistan, and other governmental and non-governmental agencies should also find this 
analysis useful in understanding the implications of this industry on the overall state building 
process in Afghanistan. 
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Chapter Two 
  
Afghanistan: Political History 
The Afghan highland, historically, has served as a crossroad and battleground for various 
empires; from Alexander the Great’s rule until the early 18th century Moghul India and Persian 
Afsharid Dynasty. In 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdali, a Pashtun commander of the largest cavalry 
contingent of the Afsharid kingdom, established modern day Afghanistan. His empire extended 
from Kandahar, Afghanistan to Mashhad in northern Iran, to Peshawar, Kashmir, and Delhi in 
India, and to Bukhara in Central Asia.2 The modern frontiers of Afghanistan, primarily 
demarcated at the end of the nineteenth century, connect three geographic and cultural 
regions: the Indian Subcontinent to the southeast, Central Asia to the north, and the Iranian 
Plateau in the west. A landlocked country, Afghanistan borders Pakistan, Iran, and the Central 
Asian Republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and shares a fifty-mile border with 
China.3 
 Afghanistan, once again, became a battleground between empires in the nineteenth-
century’s clash of the British India and Russian empires in Central Asia, known as “the Great 
Game”. The Russian imperial movement toward Afghanistan and India persuaded the British 
strategic planners to adopt a “forward policy” toward Afghanistan in order to avoid Russian 
domination of Afghanistan and safeguard its position in the Indian subcontinent. Both empires, 
in part to justify their strategic and economic-driven expansions to their home audiences, 
explained their motives ideological - “to lift out the colonial nations from ignorance and civilize 
                                                          
2 Tomsen, Peter, The Wars of Afghanistan, ( USA, PublicAffairs, 2011) 
3 Ewans, Marthin, Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics, (UK, Curzen Press, 2001) 
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them”.4 Because of the “forward policy” of the British India Raj toward Afghanistan, three 
Anglo-Afghan wars took place.  
The First Anglo–Afghan War lasted from 1839 to 1842. The second Anglo-Afghan war 
(1878-1880) was triggered by Amir Shir Ali Khan's refusal to accept a British mission in Kabul. In 
1879, after the death of Amir Shir Ali Khan, his son, Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan, signed the 
Gandomak Treaty with Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari representing the British India Empire. 
By signing the treaty, Afghans officially granted the control of their foreign policy to the British 
India Raj, and accepted the British Mission in Kabul.5 
In 1919, Amanullah Khan ascended the Afghan throne following his father’s 
assassination and declared Afghanistan’s independence from Great Britain. In response to 
Britain’s refusal to acknowledge Afghanistan’s independence, Amanullah Khan declared war on 
British India.  War-weary and preoccupied with WW1, Britain, in August 1919 signed the Treaty 
of Rawalpindi, recognizing Afghan independence and returning control of Afghan foreign policy. 
King Amanullah continued to rule Afghanistan until 1929. Despite Afghanistan’s declaration of 
independence, it remained caught in a tug of war between Russia and England.  Russia, 
whether under the late czars or Communists, has viewed Afghanistan traditionally as falling 
within its sphere of influence. From the British perspective, Afghanistan served as an effective 
buffer against Russia in safeguarding British interests in India.  
In 1929, Nadir Khan, a commander in King Amanullah Khan’s army, became the king of 
Afghanistan.  He continued to rule Afghanistan until he was assassinated on November 8th, 
1933.   For the next forty years King Zahir ruled Afghanistan, bringing to the nation its longest 
                                                          
4 Tomsen, 2011 
5 Tomsen, 2011 
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period of stability since the early 1800s.  On July 17th, 1973, while King Mohammad Zahir was in 
Italy for medical treatment, Mohammad Dawood, his cousin and brother in-law, declared 
himself President in a bloodless coup.  Duad transformed Afghanistan from a monarchy to a 
republic and began to distance Afghanistan from the USSR and seek more aid from the West 
and Saudi Arabia.6 
 Over the next two years, the communists, who had supported his coup, gradually 
gained authority and offices, and systematically eliminated their political opponents. President 
Dawood concentrated more and more executive, legislative, and judicial powers in his own 
hands.  In 1975 Dawood formed the National Revolutionary Party and outlawed all other 
parties, including the communists. Gradually Dawood decreased Afghanistan’s dependence on 
the Soviet Union, dismissed communists from his cabinet, and returned Afghanistan to a policy 
of neutrality. He worked to gain the trust and friendship of the rest of the world by traveling to 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, and Turkey.  He sent envoys to Iran and China in search of aid and 
in 1974 and 1975 received visits from U.S. Secretary of State Henry.7 All these efforts prompted 
a fresh KGB attempt to reunite the communists in Kabul. In 1978, the Afghan communists 
assassinated Dawood and toppled his government, ending another illegal period of power in 
Afghan politics.  
The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the party of Afghan communists 
that had overthrown President Dawood’s government, soon faced a national rebellion, 
especially from the rural areas that had favored Dawood’s reforms and hated those introduced 
                                                          
6 Goodson, P. Larry,Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban, 
(University of Washington Press, 2001). 
7 Peterson, 2011 and Goodson, P. Larry, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise 
of the Taliban, (University of Washington Press, 2001) 
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by the communists.  Among the most hated communist-imposed policies were “gender 
equality”, “land reforms”, and changing the Afghan flag into a red flag with a yellow seal similar 
to those of the Soviet Central Asian Republics.  Of greatest concern was the belief that the 
Afghan communists would destroy Islam and impose Soviet atheism on the country.  On 
December 27th, 1979, Russia realizing that the PDPA regime was in imminent danger of collapse 
sent approximately eighty thousand Soviet troops to Afghanistan to support the PDPA 
government. Afghanistan responded to the Russian invasion with a Jihad or holy war led by the 
Mujahideen or holy warriors. The USSR’s direct military intervention in Afghanistan 
transformed the Afghan resistance into a regional and even a global geopolitical struggle. The 
Soviet invasion was met with western intervention, turning Afghanistan into a pawn of the Cold 
War rivalry.  By the time of the Soviets’ withdrawal in late 1989, Afghanistan had become a 
totally shattered and destroyed country. 8 
After the Soviet’s withdrawal in 1988-89, the Mujahideen controlled all of the country 
except the area around the capital, Kabul, and some cities that remained in the hands of the 
PDPA’s last President, Dr. Najibullah.   With the Soviet withdrawal, the PDPA regime in Kabul 
had little support and in 1992 Kabul fell into Mujahideen control, ending the Jihad against the 
Soviets and its puppet government.  Soviet withdrawal and the defeat of the internal 
communist party did not end a state of war for the Afghan people.  Rather, an international war 
of defense against aggression morphed into an internal civil war among the Mujahideen who 
now bitterly fought one another for power. 
                                                          
8 Peterson, 2011, and Larry, 2001, p.53,  
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While engaged in a civil war, a new movement, the Taliban, emerged in 1994. As the 
people were sick of war, the Taliban provided the Afghan people with an antidote to the state 
of anarchy that had pervaded Afghanistan since 1979. The Taliban captured Kandahar in 1994, 
and two years later, won control of Kabul. The Taliban received at least initial support from ISI 
(the Pakistani spy agency), who hoped that the Taliban would open and protect Afghan roads 
from disruptive warlords, allowing Pakistan to connect with Central Asia.9 As the Taliban 
solidified their control over 80-90% of the country, Pakistan increased its support, hoping to 
turn Afghanistan into its own client regime.  Except for recognition by Pakistan, S.A. and the 
U.A.E, the international community withheld assistance, focusing instead on the Taliban’s 
record of human rights violations, including prohibitions against women working and attending 
school, support for al Qaeda, and intolerant policies toward religious and ethnic minorities.  
In the immediate aftermath of the horrific attacks of September 9th, 2001 on the World 
Trade Centers and the Pentagon, the U.S. government’s first target was Osama Bin Laden and 
his Al-Qaeda terrorist network, the alleged perpetuators behind the attack, and the Taliban, for 
harboring al Qaeda in Afghanistan. On October 7th, 2001 the United States and British aircraft 
started bombing targets in Afghanistan, marking the start of Operation Enduring Freedom. On 
December 22nd, same year, following the removal of the Taliban’s regime, Hamid Karzai became 
the head of an interim power-sharing government.10 
After the Taliban ouster in late 2001, the newly installed Afghan authorities were 
charged with restoring peace and rebuilding the war-torn country. On October 9th, 2004, for the 
                                                          
9  Favre, 2005, Rashid, Ahmed, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, ( United States, 
Yale University Press, 2001) 
10 Samuel, Charlie, Americans at War: Timeline of the War on Terror, (New York, Gareth Steven Publishing, 
2012) 
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first time in its history, Afghanistan held democratic elections, electing Hamid Karzai to a five-
year term as President.   On August 20th, 2009, Afghan voters returned to the polls, electing 
Karzai to another five-year term.11 
Afghanistan: A Guide to Government   
The new Afghan constitution established a unitary form of government, with all political 
authority vested in the capital, Kabul. Afghanistan has the following subnational units of 
government:     
1. Wolayat (Province) each headed by the provincial governor which is appointed by the 
president through the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). There are 
34 provinces currently. 
2. Woleswali (District); There are approximately 335 Woleswalis; each province containing 
3 to17 woleswali. The district chiefs are appointed by the president through the IDLG 
and consultation of provincial governor.  
3. Sharwali Wolayat (Provincial Municipality); each province has a municipality. The 
Municipals are appointed by the president through the Ministry of Interior Affairs.    
4. Sharwali Woleswali (District Municipality); each district has a municipality but some has 
none.  
None of these levels of governments possess jurisdictional authority to enact policies, but 
delegated to implement only those laws, programs, and policies created by the central 
government.    
                                                          
11 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan  
http://www.iec.org.af/eng/ 
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 Organizationally, the central government in Afghanistan comprises 30 ministries, two 
constitutional agencies (The Office of the President and the Supreme Court), eight independent 
bodies, and other central government agencies. Almost all high and mid-level officials of the 
subnational administration are appointed by the central government. The governor, district 
head (Woleswal), security commander, and other high level officials are appointed by the 
president while the rest of mid-level administrators are appointed by the relevant institutions 
in the center. 12 
  The Afghan constitution also calls for a parliament comprising two houses; the Wolesi 
Jirga (House of the People) and Mishrano Jirga (House of the Elders). The Wolesi Jirga shall be 
an elected body through fair and free elections. The members of the Wolesi Jirga according to 
the constitution should not exceed two hundred and fifty members. They should be elected 
proportionately to the people of each constituency or province regulated by the election law 
with at least two female members from each province. 
 The Mishrano Jirga is to be elected or appointed as follows: each provincial council 
elects one member, amongst themselves, to send to Mishrano Jirga for a period of 4 years; 
from among the district level councils, one member is elected for a period of three years. The 
President appoints the remaining one third of the members from the experts and people of 
appropriate stature; including two representatives of the disabled and impaired, two 
representatives from the Kuchis (Nomads), and also the religious minority of the society- with 
                                                          
12 Manning et al, 2004 
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50 percent of these to be women.13 Mishrano Jirga has 102 members. The tuner of the Afghan 
parliament is five years. 14 
 Afghanistan has, at least in theory, an independent judiciary system. The Afghan 
judiciary comprises one Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal and Primary Courts whose 
organization and authority shall be regulated by law. The Supreme Court shall be the highest 
judicial organ, heading the judicial power of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Supreme 
Court, according to the constitution, shall consist of nine members, appointed by the President 
with the approval of Wolesi Jirga. The members shall be initially appointed in the following 
manner: three members for a period of four years, three members for seven years, and three 
members for ten years. Later appointments shall be for period of ten years. Appointment of 
members for a second term shall not be permitted. The President shall appoint one of its 
members as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  
 The Afghan constitution also calls for the election of Provincial councils, which were held 
in 2009, and for the election of district councils and municipalities, which have not yet occurred 
due to various excuses by the Afghan government15. According to the constitution, there shall 
be a provincial council in every province. Members of the provincial councils according to law, 
shall be elected for four years by the residents of the province, proportionate to the 
population. The members of the provincial council shall be elected through free, general, secret 
as well as direct elections. The provincial council shall elect one of its members as President. 
 
                                                          
13 Manning et al, 2004 
14 The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Chapter 8, article 81-90, 
http://www.Afghanembassy.com.pl/cms/uploads/images/Constitution/The%20Constitution.pdf 
15 The excuses included security, logistic, and lack of resources 
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Afghanistan: Opium Industry’s History 
Historically, Afghanistan, like many cultures around the world, cultivated plants such as 
poppies, in sufficient quantities for domestic medicinal purposes.  Literature indicates that 
poppy cultivation first appeared in Afghanistan approximately 2300 hundred years ago.  
Whether Alexander the Great introduced the plant to Afghanistan and South Asia during his 
conquest of the region in 325-327 BC, or Arab conquerors in their drive through South Asia to 
India, or traders, is unknown.16 
According to David Macdonald, the author of Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws and 
the Scorpion Tales, a1905 British Indian Government report mentioned that opium poppy was 
one of the main autumn-planted- spring-harvested crops in Nangarhar province in the eastern 
part of Afghanistan.17 The Imperial Gazetteer of British India, in the same year, reported that 
opium was produced in the districts of Herat valley (now Herat province), Kabul, Kandahar, and 
Jalalabad (now the center of Nangarhar province), but not in large quantities.18 
In 1923, British officials recorded that Afghanistan had harvested 75 tons of raw opium 
from approximately 4000 hectors of land, quite a significant amount given that the population 
of the country at the time was roughly 10 million.19 In 1924 at the Second Opium Conference, 
organized by the Permanent Central Board under the control of the League of Nations, 
Afghanistan reported poppy cultivation in Badakhshan, Herat, and Jalalabad (now Nangarhar) 
                                                          
16 Macdonald, Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws and Scorpion Tales ( New York: Pluto Press, 2007)  59–60 
 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Opium: Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy (New York: I. B. Tauris &Co. Ltd., 2009) 
17 Macdonald, Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws and Scorpion Tales, 60 
18 Imperial Gazetteer of India: Afghanistan and Nepal(Lahore, Sang-e-Meel Publication , 1999) P. 30 
19 Dee Pak Lal, “Endangering the War on Terror by the War on Drugs,” World Economics 9, no. 3 
(July-September 2008): 2. 
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provinces.20 Few reports or documents exist regarding the extent of poppy cultivation over the 
next fifty years.  One the one hand, a UN report mentioned that a royal decree in 1945 
prohibiting opium production had reduced production to 12 metric tons in 1956.  On the other 
hand, some journalists have alleged that, following royal tradition, King Mohammad Zahir’s 
family controlled the relatively scarce opium trade throughout the 1950s and 1960s.21 
By the 1970s, however, Afghanistan was seen as a country where narcotics constituted a 
serious problem and the government was unable to control either the production or trafficking 
to neighboring countries.22  As the producer of 30% of the world’s hashish, Kabul became 
known as the hashish capital of the world, drawing 5,000 to 6,000 Western “hippies” to its 
doorstep.23 
The growth of Afghanistan’s opium industry to become the number one producer of 
illicit opium in the world is the result of more than three decades of persistent instability, which 
began in 1979 with the Soviet invasion and occupation. After 10 years of war against the 
Soviets, different factions of the Mujahideen continued to fight for power until 1994. Chita D. 
Mass, an expert on Afghan affairs and Senior Associate, Asia Division, at the German Institute 
for International and Security Affairs, describes the growth of the drug industry of Afghanistan 
in four phases: 
1: 1979-1989- In this early phase, drugs cultivation and production increased gradually. During 
this stage, the Mujahideen leaders, who used the revenues to finance their anti-Soviet Jihad 
(Holy war), were the primary benefiters. 
                                                          
20  Macdonald, Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws and Scorpion Tales, 60 
21 Alexander Cockburn & Jeffrey St. Clair, Whiteout: the CIA, Drugs and the Press, (London, Verso, 1999) P.262 
22 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003 “ The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International 
Problem” http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf 
23 Booth, Cannabis: A History, 289. 
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2: 1989-1996- In the second phase, the drug industry rose to become the mujahedeen’s most 
important illicit source of income for financing their wars against one another. (Civil war period) 
3: 1996-2001- In the third phase, though the country witnessed comparative stability, the 
Taliban used the drug industry as source of revenue, by officially taxing it. The Northern Alliance 
(portion of the former Mujahideen resisting the Taliban in northern Afghanistan), used the 
revenues from drug industry to maintain their powerful position in areas under their control 
(Taliban regime’s rule). In the last quarter of 2000, the Talibanissued a decree, banning the 
cultivation and production of opium.  Because of the ban, opium cultivation decreased from 
82,172 hectors in 2000, to 7,606 hectors in 2001, a 91% decrease, and the lowest level of 
cultivation in recent history. Similarly, opium production decreased 94% from 3,278 tons in 
2000 to 185 metric tons in 2001.24 
 While the Taliban’s ban, without a doubt, effectively reduced opium poppy cultivation 
and production, U.S. State Department experts regarded the ban’s purpose with suspicion.   
Raphael F. Perl, in his 2001 Congressional Research Services’ report to the Congress stated that: 
the true purpose behind the Taliban’s ban was to reduce the global supply of opium, thereby 
driving up prices, and allowing the Taliban, (which the UN reported had stockpiled some 60% of 
their stock) to sell off these extensive stockpiles at a maximum profit.25 
4:  2002- to present day- In the fourth phase starting from 2002, the drug industry’s profits 
continued as a source of income for former warlords and drug lords.  The difference now is that 
drug profits had allowed the purchase of positions, power, and influence in the institutions of 
                                                          
24 UNODC, “Annual Opium production survey2001, Afghanistan” 
25 Raphael, F. Perl, “Taliban and the Drug Trade, Congressional Research Services’ Report for Congress, 2001”, 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/crs/6210.pdf ( accessed 21 January, 2012) 
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the new legally established government. Maas argues that starting in 2002 the drug industry 
flourished because of the combined presence of a powerful shadow economy and a weak state. 
Using United Nation’s Office on Drug and Crimes (UNODC) statistics, the following two tables 
demonstrate the correlation between the nation’s political experiences and opium 
production.Opium Production in the country depended on the poppy yield. The UNODC office 
produced figures from 1980 until 2011. I have divided the period into two phases, 1980-1999 
and 2000-2011 for a better demonstration of the Afghan opium industry. These two periods 
differ in terms of political, economic, social, and security situation in Afghanistan. While the 
first period was characterized by Jihad, civil war, and anarchy, the second period from early 
2002 is considered as an example of a highly internationalized state building process.  The 
middle of the second period, starting from 2004, is the starting point for the war against illicit 
drugs. Since then, various Afghan government institutions with the help of international allies, 
have attempted to curb the Afghan illicit opium industry. However, so far no desirable results 
have been achieved in a sustainable manner on the national level. The Following figure 
demonstrates the production growth of Afghan opium in the first period, 1980-1999. 
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Figure 1: Opium Production, 1980-1999 (Metric Tons) 
Although Afghanistan has been world’s leading cultivator since 1991, its low yield meant 
that Myanmar (Burma) possessed the dubious distinction of leading producer until 2003.  As 
discussed previously and in later chapters, a variety of factors contributed to the expansion of 
Afghan opium industry, including the Taliban’s 2001 ban, which caused the price of opium to 
sky-rocket, leading to an increase in growth and production between 2001 -2003. In 2003, the 
same year that Afghanistan assumed its position as the leading producer of opium, the Afghan 
government created the National Drug Control Strategy to systematically fight against the illicit 
opium cultivation and production, and trafficking and consumption in Afghanistan. The 
following chart shows the amount of opium produced from 2001 until 2011 in Afghanistan.  
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Figure 2: Opium Production, 2000-2011 (Metric Tons).  
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Figure 3: Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1994-2011 (Thousand Hectors) 
The charts above indicate that Afghanistan since 1994 has gradually increased the 
cultivation of opium with the exception of 2001, the year of the Taliban’s ban.  Since then, 
cultivation levels have varied with the highest levels occurring in 2006 -07 and slight decreases 
occurring in 2009-10 due to low global prices resulting from high supplies produced the 
previous two years. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, the growth of Afghan 
Opium Industry is not because of a single factor, but a combination of external and internal, 
political and economic factors. 
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Chapter Three 
Factors Contributing to the Afghan Opium Industry 
Afghanistan historically has produced opium for domestic medicinal usage, but has no 
cultural history of producing opium as a trade good.Afghanistan gradually became one of the 
leading producers of illicit opium and its derivate heroin and other illicit drugs after the Russian 
invasion, becoming the global leader in cultivation and production of opium in 2003. This trend 
of Afghan illicit opium growth is attributable to several domestic and international factors. War, 
poverty, climate conditions, lawlessness, lack of alternative legal livelihoods, and destruction of 
the agriculture sector are among the factors that contributed to the expansion of opium 
cultivation, production, and trafficking in Afghanistan. This chapter examines some of these 
important factors in detail. 
External factors: Pre-2001 
As previously noted, the Afghan people have cultivated opium for domestic medicinal 
use for several centuries. British records from India between 1905 and 1923 indicate that by 
this time, opium cultivation had increased sufficiently to allow its sale to neighboring nations – 
a trade rumored to be under the control of the Afghan royal family.  The Shah’s 1955 ban on 
the cultivation and use of opium in Iran provided a further incentive for the Afghan production 
and marketing of smuggled opium to Iran. Until the mid-1970s, opium produced in Afghanistan 
was almost entirely exported to Iran.26 
By the end of the 1900’s, several external events, including the Soviet invasion into 
Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, and Pakistan’s ban on opium production, had 
                                                          
26 Chouvy, Pierre-arnaud, Opium: Uncovering the Politics of Poppy, ( USA, Harvard University Press, 2010), and 
Alexander Cockburn & Jeffrey St. Clair, Whiteout: the CIA, Drugs and the Press, (London, Verso, 1999) 
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resulted in the significant increase in Afghan opium production. The USSR invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 is probably the most important external factor that contributed to the 
expansion, cultivation, and production of opium in Afghanistan. As Citha D. Maass explains, the 
major commercial production of drugs in Afghanistan began with the anti-Soviet Jihad of 
1979.27 
In Iran, the replacement of the Shah with a strict Islamic government ushered in 
stringent bans on opium production and narcotic use. The previous year, General Mohammad 
Zia-ul-Haq, the Pakistani military dictator, announced that production, consumption, and 
commerce of all intoxicants, opium included, were to be prohibited in Pakistan within one year 
(The Prohibition or Enforcement of Hadd act). The enforcement of this act resulted in a 
dramatic decline in Pakistan’s opium poppy production- providing another market for Afghan 
produced opium. 
In addition, a drought throughout Southeast Asia in the 1970s-80s further decreased the 
global supply of opium, providing additional incentives to Afghan producers and traders. Three 
shifts in the Asian market of opium increased the motivation for Afghan producer to fill the 
supply gap in the world market: the reduction of Turkish opium cultivation starting in 1974, 
geographic shift of opium production from the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand) to 
the Golden Crescent in Central Asia (Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan) in the 1970s; and later, the 
successful counter-narcotics efforts within Iran and Pakistan. The latter had more direct impact 
                                                          
27 Maass, 2011 
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on Afghanistan than the first two.28 After the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan in 1989, 
opium production increased significantly. 
In the mid-1990s, the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan. The international community’s 
response to the rise of the Taliban was to terminate all foreign aid, forcing the Taliban to 
pursue revenues from opium production.  As Lee V. Bartonargues in Illegal Drugs and the 
Governmental Policies, presented with a dysfunctional economic systemand a lack of 
international aid, the Taliban, like their warlord predecessors, instituted a tax on opium to 
finance their operations.29 
External Factors Post-2001: 
Since 2001, Afghanistan has become the premier example of internationalized state 
building. Armed forces of more than 40 countries have assisted the Afghan security sector, and 
foreign aid has become the principle source of revenue to rebuild the Afghan State and finance 
its operations.30 Ironically, this international interest in Afghan nation-building led not to a 
decrease in opium production, but a dramatic increase.  International involvement provided 
easier access to foreign markets and new actors in the supply chain.  Over the last decade, 
Afghanistan has provided 90% of heroin to Western Europe and Russia, an amount reaching 
120 tons annually.  Afghan heroin also feeds a fast growing habit in neighboring nations of  
Western and Central Asia as well as elsewhere.31 Approximately 14% of heroin in the United 
States today comes from Afghanistan compared to 7% in 2001, a 200% increase since the US-
                                                          
28 Maass, 2011 
29 Baton, Lee V, Illegal Drugs and Governmental Policies,  (Nova Science Publishers. Inc., 2007) P. 104 
30 Mason, The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing the Inaction, ed. Whit Mason,(Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 
31Ward, Christopher,  Byrd, William, Afghanistan’s Opium Drug Economy (2004), World Bank Report, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Publications-Resources/20325060/AFOpium-Drug-
Economy-WP.pdf.pdf ( accessed Feb. 8th, 2012) 
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led invasion of 2001.32 Post-2001 Afghanistan’s access to the world opium market has been 
easier than ever before in the history Afghan opium industry. The following map shows the 
trafficking routes of Afghan opium to the international market.  
 
Source: CNN
33 
                                                          
32 Glaze, John A.,  Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counter-Narcotics Strategy (2007), Strategic Studies 
Institute, US Army War College, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub804.pdf 
(accessed Feb. 2nd, 2012) 
33 CNN, , http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/10/21/un.heroin.trade/index.html#cnnSTCOther1 
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As the above map illustrates, there are many routes for moving opium from 
Afghanistan, but four of them stand out. Most of the Afghan opium trade flows to the outside 
through the Central Asia route. Corrupt officials on both sides of the border and the existence 
of strong drug mafias in the Central Asian Republics allow Afghan opium to enter international 
markets. Second and third to the Central Asian route, are the routes through Pakistan and Iran 
respectively.  Running a distant fourth, is smuggling drugs on aircraft through Indian airspace. 
Domestic Factors 
Pre-2001: 
The growth of Afghan opium production was not solely because of external factors. 
Internal Afghan factors contributed greatly to the accelerated growth rate. Historically, 
cultivation levels have fluctuated broadly; influenced by variety of domestic factors, including 
official policies and actions.  As mentioned previously, the extent to which various governments 
throughout first half of the 20th century sought to control production is unclear.  Some sources 
indicate that from 1905 until 1960s, ruling governments not only failed to institute policies to 
counter the narcotics trade, but supported and monopolized the trade.34 A few sources note 
the existence of a 1945 decree prohibiting the cultivation and use of opium.  Whether 
supported or maligned, by 1956, the total Afghan production of opium was only 12 tons. By the 
late 1970’s and early 1980’s, numerous sources agree that Afghanistan had gradually become a 
major producer of opium.35 
Domestically, a variety of factors including continued war, warlordism, poverty, 
destroyed economic and agricultural infrastructures, corruption, climate conditions, and 
                                                          
34Alexander Cockburn & Jeffrey St. Clair, 1999, Imperial Gazetteer of India: Afghanistan and Nepal, 1999 
35 Macdonald 2007, Maass 2011, UNODC annual surveys  1994-2011,  
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markets development contributed to Afghanistan’ elevated status as a primary producer and 
cultivator of opium. Discussed below are some of the major domestic factors that helped 
Afghanistan become a leading cultivator and producer of opium. 
1: Persistent War 
For the last quarter century, since the 1979 Soviet invasion, Afghanistan has found itself 
embroiled in defensive and civil wars. Closely correlated with the start of these wars is 
Afghanistan’s rise to the world’s leading producer and cultivator of opium. Afghanistan 
responded to the Russian invasion with a Jihad or holy war. Comprised of autonomous Jihadi 
commanders in control of various regions of Afghanistan, the Mujahideen possessed a 
reputation as fierce fighters, but fighters without sophisticated weaponry. Although receiving 
some aid from Western and Islamic states, the Mujahideen turned to opium production to 
purchase weapons and finance their militias. 36Beginning with the Russian invasion, the wars in 
Afghanistan can be divided into three phases. Each phase contributed to the rise of Afghanistan 
as the leading opium producer. 
1: First Phase, 1979-1989: 
This period is characterized by the Russian invasion and the Afghan’s response to the 
Soviet aggression with a Jihad (holy-war). The Russian invasion is the initiating factor that led 
Afghanistan to three decades of war and to a drastic increase of opium production. In 1979, 
Afghanistan produced 200 mt of opium, by 1985 production had almost doubled to 450 tons 
and by the time of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, production had increased 3-fold to 1,200 
                                                          
36 Favre, Raphy, “ Exploring the Roots of Opium and Illicit Economy in Afghanistan (2005)” , 
http://aizon.org/Roots%20of%20Opium%20and%20Illicit%20Economy.pdf ( accessed Feb. 2nd , 2012) 
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tons.37 During this period, the Mujahideen commanders, besides receiving aid from different 
states, turned to opium as a source of income to maintain their militias and war against the 
Russians.  
Beginning in late 1985, the US government began supplying the Mujahideen with man-
portable Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Capable of taking down aircrafts, these missiles were 
responsible for slowly, but surely, forcing Soviet troops out of rural areas. As the Soviet troops 
withdrew, the Mujahideen exerted increased authority over these areas – an authority that 
extended to increasing opium production.38 
2: Second Phase, 1989-1996: 
 
By the time of the Soviets’ withdrawal in 1988-89, the Mujahideen controlled all of the 
country except the area around the capital, Kabul, and few cities which remained in the hands 
of the Afghan Communist regime in Kabul.  With the Soviet withdrawal, the West no longer 
aided the mujahedeen, forcing the regional leaders to depend solely upon opium as a source of 
income.39 In 1992, Kabul fell into Mujahideen control, and the Jihad against the Soviets and its 
puppet government ended.  
 Soviet withdrawal and the defeat of the internal Communist Party did not end a state of 
war for the Afghan people.  Competing to fill the power vacuum, the Mujahideen engaged in a 
bitter civil war, fighting one another for control of territory and opium production.  Again to pay 
for their weaponry and militia, the Mujahideen promoted opium cultivation.  On average, 
opium production doubled between 1990 and 1996, reaching a high of 3,000 tons in 1994.   
                                                          
37 UNODC, “ Afghanistan Annual Survey of Opium (2008)” , 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf (accessed Feb. 2nd, 
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38 Favre, 2005 
39 Maass, 2011 
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3: Final Phase, 1996-2001: 
 
As the Mujahideen fought one another, the Taliban emerged in 1994. Sick of war, the 
Taliban provided the Afghan people with an antidote to the state of anarchy that had pervaded 
Afghanistan since 1979.  In 1994, the Taliban captured Kandahar in 1994, and two years later, 
won control of Kabul.40By 2000, the Taliban controlled 80-90% of the state’s territory.   
Pressing internal reasons, such as warlordism and solidifying control of the rural areas, 
and external needs such as gaining international recognition complicated the Taliban’s ability to 
establish a coherent opium policy. As the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar stated after 
capturing Kandahar, his priorities were first to eliminate warlords, and second, to fight opium 
production and smuggling.41  As a result, production during the Taliban’s first year remained 
stable. When the Taliban entered Kabul in 1996, the opportunity to fund governmental needs 
became obvious as “influential heroin smugglers offered to pay a “zakat” tax of 10% to the 
Taliban exchequer for permission to transport heroin out of the region. Not surprisingly, the 
capture of Kabul coincided with an increase in opium production. As the Taliban extended their 
control over the country, reaching to 80% to 90% of the country in 2000, opium production 
increased simultaneously, reaching its highest levels to date in 1999. The following year in July, 
Mullah Omar issued a decree banning opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan as un-
Islamic. As a result of the ban, opium production and cultivation declined by almost 90% in 
2001 compared to the year before.42 
 
                                                          
40 Maley, William, Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, (New York, NYU Press, 1998) 
41 Favre, 2005 
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2: Destruction of Agricultural Infrastructure  
 
 Afghanistan is a nation of rural farmers. Eighty percent of the population lives in rural 
areas. Eighty to eighty-five percent of the population is engaged in farming or agricultural 
related activities in a country where only 12% of the land is arable. Agriculture, like all sectors, 
suffered heavily from the war.43 In 1979 when Russia invaded the country, fierce resistance, 
particularly in rural areas, provoked harsh retaliation from the Soviet military. The Soviets 
torched farms, orchards, and harvests, bombed two-thirds of the villages, and destroyed one-
quarter to one-third of the irrigation systems, farms, orchards, harvests, irrigation system, and 
canals. Live-stocks decreased by 77% between 1979 and 1989.44 In addition to the Soviets’ 
destruction of the countryside, Mujahideen fighters mined the Karez45, resulting in the 
destruction of the underground aqueduct and above ground irrigation canals, causing severe 
disruption in water distribution. With the agricultural infrastructure destroyed, farmers had few 
choices for survival except cultivation of the opium poppy, a high-value crop that consumed 
little water.46 
 Twenty-five years of war gradually altered Afghanistan’s agricultural output. Between 
1979 and 1983, the acreage of land devoted to wheat, rice, barely, cotton, corn, and other legal 
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crops declined drastically. In 1981, the average wheat acreage dropped to 50.9%, declining to 
37.2% by 1982. Corn followed a similar trend. Cotton dropped to 40% in 1981 and to only  
15.7 % by 1982.47 By 1982,Afghanistan’s rice production had decreased by 65%. By 1987, 
reports indicate that war had completely destroyed Afghanistan’s agricultural infrastructure.  
Complicating the restoration of agriculture production was the virtual impossibility of access to 
improved seeds, fertilizer, and agricultural.48 In addition, Afghanistan suffered a severe drought 
until late-2000s making opium poppies one of the few crops that could survive. To conclude, 
the devastation of agricultural sector of Afghanistan constitutes a major contributor to the 
expansion of opium cultivation. 
3: Lack of State Control and Lawlessness 
 Afghanistan, a country established in 1747, encountered the European-centered state 
system in nineteenth century when Russia and Britain advanced through Central Asia and India. 
The Afghan rulers tried to maintain their independenceby copying these empires’ militaries and 
governmental models. Following two wars with the British, Afghanistan became a protectorate 
within the British Empire, serving as a buffer zone against Russia. To strengthen the Afghan 
state and stabilize India’s northwest frontier, the British provided the ruling King, Amir Abdul 
Rahman Khan (1881-1901) with weapons and cash. The king, in turn, used the aid to establish 
the basic Afghan state structure that endured until the fall of President Najibullah in 1992.49  
From 1979 until 2001, Afghanistan has been constantly in conflict. Central governments during 
                                                          
47Yusufi, Mohammad Qasim “Effects of the War on Agriculture,” from  The Tragedy of Afghanistan: The Social, 
Cultural, and Political Impact of the Soviet Invasion, ( Routledge, 1988) 
48 Yusufi, 1988 
49 Rubin, Barnnet R., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, ( USA, Yale University Press, 2002) 
31 
 
this period were largely symbolic, unable to exercise authority outside of Kabul and the capitals 
of certain provinces. Autonomous warlords governed the rural areas where more than 90% of 
opium was cultivated and produced. The Taliban’s rule was the only period during this time 
when the Afghan people experienced some stability. Without a secure government and no 
authority to prevent opium production, leaders and farmers alike cultivated opium as a source 
of income. 
4: Climate Conditions:  
During the first phase of war (1979-1989), Afghanistan lost one-third of its population 
due to conflict-initiated displacements. In addition to this loss, destruction of agricultural 
infrastructure, anarchy, poverty, severe drought, and destroyed irrigation system transformed 
Afghanistan into a favorable place for opium. Afghan farmers gradually turned toward opium 
poppy; a hardy, nearly drought-resistant crop with a low weight to profit ratio and a high 
market demand.  Non-perishable, the produced opium does not require refrigeration or careful 
handling during transportation.50 With a shorter growing cycle than wheat and other crops, 
farmers could re-cultivate the land with livestock fodder such as maize following the opium 
harvest. Poppy straws, the dried stalks left following the opium’s extraction, served as home-
heating, saving some farmers nearly a quarter of their annual income that would have 
otherwise spent on home-heating costs. Thus, climate condition was another major driving 
force behind the Afghan opium industry growth.  
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Post-2001 Era 
 Despite the international community and Afghan governmental efforts, opium 
cultivation and production increased dramatically following the Taliban’s demise. Since 2002 
Afghanistan has contributed more than 90% of the world’s illicit drugs.  The factors contributing 
to the increase of Afghan opium production post-2001 are discussed below. 
1: Insecurity 
 The Asia Foundation’s annual surveys show that Afghans consider insecurity as the 
number one major problem facing their country.51 Not surprisingly, the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime states that insecurity is directly linked to the production and cultivation of 
opium in Afghanistan.52 In 2002, the UNODC survey reported that almost 95% of opium 
cultivation and production was concentrated in five provinces, Helmand, Nangarhar, Urozgan, 
Kandahar, and Badakhshan. From the above five provinces, the first four are located in the 
most insecure parts of Afghanistan.53 In 2011, the UNODC office again found that 95% of the 
cultivation and production of opium took place in nine provinces in the south and west, the top 
insecure provinces in the country. Helmand, the most insecure Afghan province since 2001, 
accounted for 48% of the country’s total opium cultivation in 2011, compared to 53% in 2010, 
57% in 2009, 66% in 2008, 53% in 2007, 42% in 2006, 25% in 2005, 23% in 2004 and 19% in 
2003. Opium production in the province increased by 57%, reaching 3,044 mt- equivalent to 
52% of the total 2011 production in Afghanistan. Helmand, Kandahar, Urozgan and Zabol 
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provinces are considered provinces where security conditions are classified as high or of 
extreme risk by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).54 
2: Poverty  
 After the fall of the Taliban, one of the new government’s main goals was the 
development and implementation of a national development strategy to guide Afghanistan’s 
economic revival. This strategy known as, “The Interim Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (I-ANDS) was presented to the international community as a vision for 2020 in 
Afghanistan.55  During the period of 2002-2007, Afghanistan experienced real growth rates 
ranging from 14 to 26% with an average growth rate of 16%, growth rates well above the 
average real growth rates of other post-conflict, landlocked countries. GDP per capita increased 
53% during this time, rising from approximately $200 U.S. to $306 U.S.56 As demonstrated by 
the graphs below, domestic revenues rose 500% in 2006/2007 when compared with 2002/03. 
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Figure 4: Afghanistan GDP and GDP composition, 2004-2009 
While the growth in the Afghanistan economy has been impressive, it is important to 
note that a large percentage of this growth results from the significant amount of foreign aid 
coming into the country. 57Despite the overall economic growth and macroeconomic stability 
post 9-11 in Afghanistan, poverty still remains one of the biggest problems. By any means, 
including average per capita income, life expectancy, or broader indexes like the U.N. Human 
Development Index (HDI), Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. In 
terms of the Human Development (HDI), Afghanistan ranked 169th out of 174 countries in 1996, 
155 in 2010, and 172 in 2011.58 In 2010, Afghanistan was ranked 155th and in 2011 it was 
ranked 172nd on HDI.59 
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Based on the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/8, a nationally 
representative multi-purpose survey, the poverty rate in Afghanistan was 36% in 2007/08. 
Approximately 7-8 million out of roughly 30 million Afghans live in poverty. 60 The survey does 
not provide a definition of poverty in Afghanistan. However, the survey indicates that the 
average per-capita monthly consumption expenditure of poor Afghans is only 950 Afs, but the 
corresponding figure for non-poor is still less than 2,100 Afs. The survey produces the following 
figures: 
Poverty measure:   Urban                     Rural   Kuchi (nomads) 
 National 
Poverty head count rate:     29.1         36.4    54.3       36.0 
Poverty gap index:          6.2          7.9      14.0        7.9 
              Squared poverty gap index:    2.0         2.6       5.2         2.6  
 
According to the survey, the richest quintile of the population has a share of 39 percent 
of total consumption; the poorest quintile has only 9 percent. Noticeably, the average 
consumption level of the second – non-poor – quintile is only a little above the poverty 
threshold of 1,255 Afs (50AFS=$1), suggesting that a significant proportion of these are 
vulnerable to falling below the poverty line. Provincial-level poverty estimates show that more 
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than half the population is poor in 8 out of the 34 provinces.61 Taking the level of poverty into 
consideration, it is not unexpected that people turned to poppy cultivation as a source of 
income. The UNODC annual survey states that the majority of the Afghan farmers, when asked 
their reasons for cultivating opium, mentioned poverty as the primary reason. It is important to 
note that the surveys further found that almost 90% of Afghan famers responded that if 
alternative livelihoods existed that would let them out of poverty, they would not grow 
poppies.62 
3: Lack of Alternative Livelihoods and Climate Condition 
 "We know it's bad to grow poppy but we have to do it. There are no jobs and wheat is 
worthless. If the government gives us food and jobs then we will stop doing this,” a farmer in 
the eastern part of Afghanistan told a news agency.63  Rural areas lack most of the basic 
services; have no functioning infrastructure, and scarce income-generating activities. 
 There is a lack of reliable data about the employment ratio in Afghanistan and what 
does exist is often contradictory. For example, the CIA estimated that in 2005, 40% of the 
Afghan labor force (15 million) was unemployed, a figure that had decreased to 35% in 2008.64 
The productivity of the agriculture sector is hampered by water shortages, caused by rain 
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shortfalls and destroyed irrigation systems, lack of credit, little mechanization, insufficient 
outreach of agricultural and veterinary extension services, and poor accessibility of markets and 
communities. 65 Opium poppy on the other hand is a drought-resistant crop with shorter grow-
cycles, labor intensive, multi-use, non-perishable, and easily handled and transported - a crop 
that fits well into the climatic conditions of rural Afghanistan.  
 According to the UNODC opium surveys of the country, lack of alternative livelihoods is 
amongst the important reasons farmer cited for planting opium poppy.66 High prices of Opium 
and comparatively very low prices of other licit crops lead farmers to cultivate opium for 
generating income. The UNODC‘s “Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey (ORSA) in the 
country shows the following prices for opium and other licit crop in 2010 and 2011. The prices 
are measured in $U.S. per KG. 
Crop Name ORSA 2010 ORSA 2011 % Differences  
Dry Opium 69 281 306% 
Fresh Opium 61 216 251% 
Wheat 0.26 0.38 31% 
Rice 0.89 0.88 -1% 
Maize 0.24 0.34 2% 
Table 1: Village level prices of dry opium and food grains in February 2010 and March 2011 
Both surveys confirmed a strong link between agricultural assistance and poppy cultivation.67  
Villages, which had not received agricultural assistance, were more likely to grow poppy than 
the villages that had received agricultural subsidies.  And as the UNODC reports indicated, 
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among those villages surveyed, only 36% had received agricultural assistances in terms of 
seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation facilities in 2010. 
 
4: Corruption and Lack of Law enforcement 
 According to the Transparency International Organization (TIO), Afghanistan has one of 
the most highly corrupt governments in the world. Including Afghanistan in its study of 
corruption for the first time in 2007, TIO has subsequently ranked Afghanistan as:  172ndof 179 
countries in 2007; 176thof 180 in 2008; 179th of 180 in 2009; 176th of 178 in 2010, and 180th of 
182 in 2011.68 Corruption and erosion of the rule of law are the two other consequences of 
opium money in Afghanistan.   According to the 2010 UNODC study of corruption in 
Afghanistan, it is almost impossible to obtain a public service in Afghanistan without paying a 
bribe. In a 12-month period, according to the report, Afghans paid approximately $2.5 billion in 
bribes – an amount equivalent to almost one quarter of Afghanistan’ GDP. Not surprisingly, the 
study found that corruption is one of the main reasons that Afghans distrust their 
government.69 
 Corruption is closely associated with the opium trade.  High and low ranking 
government officials are involved in the opium trade.70 Farmers bribe the police and counter-
narcotics eradication forces not to eradicate their opium. Drug traffickers, on the other hand, 
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pay the law enforcement personnel to ignore or, in some cases, protect their movements. For 
many former warlords, now drug lords, the opium trade has brought huge financial benefits 
and power. In some provinces, drug lordspromote opium cultivation by bribing or influencing 
local officials through money or political pressure from the center. “Encounters with corruption 
are so pervasive in the lives of Afghan people that corruption may literally determine whether 
parents can afford food and clothing, whether a child is admitted to school, and whether a 
family can enjoy the protection of law enforcement actors”71Widespread corruption in 
Afghanistan facilitates the opium production. Warlordism seriously undermines the national 
government’s operations through exercise of informal power. The power of the warlords and 
the opium-related corruption weaken the national and local governments. Because of this 
weakness, the enforcement of law becomes difficult. 72The corruption is also what makes 
counter narcotics campaigns difficult to execute successfully.73 
 To conclude, opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan are not the result of a 
single or afew factors, but result from a series of interrelated and interdependent factors that 
together create a vicious cycle. To break this cycle a highly coordinated, specific, and relevant 
set of efforts, policies, and programs is required. It is a struggle for the long-term and one that 
requires patience, honesty, and commitment.  
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Chapter Four 
Current Policies  
 States affected by illicit drugs have invested in counter-narcotics initiatives for the last 
several decades. Afghanistan, being the largest producer of illicit drugs, has been among those 
states. Since the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, the Afghan government and its 
international allies have implemented a number of policies to fight the growing problem of 
illicit drugs. To date, none of the strategies tried have proven successful. This chapter analyzes 
Afghanistan’s existing counter-narcotics strategies and the reasons for their failures.  
1: Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy: 
 In 2003, the Afghan government formulated the nation’s first National Drug Control 
Strategy (NDCS).74 The strategy’s stated overall goal is to “Secure a sustainable decrease in 
cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs with a view to complete and 
sustainable elimination.” As explained in the government’s 2006 report National Drug Control 
Strategy, this goal reflects the Afghan constitution and Law on Narcotics which states that the 
cultivation, production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs, including opium are illegal 
activities. Pursuant to the stated goal, the government intends to eliminate all aspects of the 
opium economy, including cultivation, production, and trafficking through the eradication of 
illicit crops and the prosecution of all those involved in the drug chain.75 
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To accomplish this, the government’sNational Drug Control Strategy lists four priorities:  
1. Disruption of the drugs trade by targeting the traffickers and their backers, and the 
elimination of the drugs trade bases 
2. Diversification and strengthening rural legal livelihood 
3. Reduction of the illicit drugs demand and treatment of problem drugs users 
4. Strengthening state institution in the center and in provincial level vital to the 
counternarcotic strategy. 
The NDCS has further articulated eight “pillars”, or areas of additional governmental efforts 
necessary for successfully attaining these priorities:   
1- Public Awareness, 2- International and Regional Cooperation, 3:-Alternative Livelihoods, 
4- Demand Reduction, 5- Law Enforcement, 6- Criminal Justice, 7- Eradication, and 8- Institution 
Building76 
 These goals, as stated on paper, appear well-considered.  But as the last several years 
have demonstrated and as stated at the beginning of the thesis, the primary failure of 
Afghanistan’s counter narcotic policy can be summarized as one of over-centralization. As the 
following sections explain, the central government’s failure to consult with sub-national 
authorities and to integrate an understanding of the reasons for opium cultivation and 
production within each local area, has led to “a one size fits all” set of strategies. The central 
government’s decision not to include the local authorities in designing and implementing 
programs and sanctions has further compounded this problem. A lack of local involvement and 
coordination has seriously undermined any hope of effectively combatting Afghanistan’s drug 
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problem. Overshadowing these difficulties is a lack of agreement between the Afghan 
government and the international community regarding how to approach Afghan counter 
narcotic policy. As discussed below, some of the major policies applied in line with the NDCS 
are as follow. 
1:  Eradication 
 Eradication, or crop destruction by force, is a strategy or tool used in a number of 
countries, such as Colombia, Pakistan, Thailand, Burma, and others, to fight illicit drugs.  While 
eradication has had positive effects in some places, in others, the effects have proven to be 
short-lived positive outcomes or simply to cause a shift of production to neighboring districts, 
provinces, and countries. In Afghanistan, eradication as a strategy has been 
counterproductive.77 “Eradication will not work in Afghanistan; it will only create social 
conflicts. It will be another war against drugs. And who in this country (referring to Afghanistan) 
needs another war?” this has been the assessment of Leo Brandenberg, Project for alternative 
livelihood team leader in Jalalabad city, Afghanistan.  
 The eradication efforts are part of the Afghan NDCS which is supported by the 
international community. The Central Eradication Poppy Monitoring (CEPM) cell in Ministry of 
Counter Narcotic is the institution which provides information on eradication targets. This cell is 
co-funded by the British government. According to Peter Holland, head of the UK Government’s 
Afghan Drugs Inter Departmental Unit (ADIDU): “The area that we are particularly focusing on is 
providing targeted information to make sure that any eradication is carried out in areas where 
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alternative livelihoods already exist, so it is targeting those we describe as the greedy, not the 
needy. We also support UNODC and the government of Afghanistan to verify that eradication 
has taken place.”  The Eradication efforts which are carried by the Afghan government are in 
collaboration with the US- Controlled Central Poppy Eradication force (CCPEF), US’s Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and Afghan 
National Police (ANP). Local governor-led forces and other institutions are involved too.  
 The US and NATO counter narcotics strategies in the Post-Taliban era have evolved from 
ignoring the drug issue to an all-out emphasis on eradication. In 2002, the US decided that 
engaging in counter-narcotics efforts would divert it from its main mission, chasing Al-Qaeda 
and Taliban. In post-TalibanAfghanistan, initially the anti-drugs efforts were assigned to Britain, 
police and judicial reforms were assigned to Germany and Italy respectively. The British efforts 
to curb drugs from Afghanistan had no significant results.78Eradication efforts of opium fields in 
Afghanistan have included both ground eradication and aerial spraying. Neither has proven 
effective. In the initial phase of eradication in 2002, local power holders destroyed the crop of 
their local rivals while leaving the lands of those who were loyal to them. This display of double-
standard and failure to deliver alternative livelihood to the farmers whose crops were 
eradicated, challenged the credibility of the strategy and sparked the anger of local farmers. 
Successive eradication efforts continued to be ineffective due to the government’s persistent 
inability to fulfill promises to the farmers to provide realistic alternative livelihoods.  Rather 
than achieving progress, the government strategy created disappointment, distrust, and 
                                                          
78 Jelsma, Martin et al, “ Losing Ground: Drug Control and War in Afghanistan-2006”, 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/200702281633543041.pdf (accessed March 3, 
2012) 
44 
 
resentment.79 The policies in regard to counter-narcotics are formulated in the center. Areas 
are targeted by the central government. Thus, the results are always undesirable because of 
the lack of understanding of the central authorities of the complex nature of opium cultivation 
and production in rural Afghanistan.  According to Gulab Mangal, the governor of Helmand 
province, the selection of areas for targeted eradication by the center is one of the major 
failures of eradication policy. He believes local authorities have a better understanding of the 
opium production and cultivation in the region and they should be the leading forces behind 
selecting areas for targeted eradication, not the center.80 
According to the UNODC, another obstacle to the eradication strategy is the presence of 
insecurity and insurgents in many parts of the country. “ in 2008, security incidents associated 
with eradication activities in Hilmand, Kandahar, Hirat, Nimroz, Kapisa, Kabul and Nangarhar 
provinces included shooting and mine explosions resulting in the death of at least 78 people, 
most of whom were policemen. This is an increase of about 75% compared to the 19 deaths in 
2007. The major incidents were in Nangarhar and Nimroz provinces”.81 The UNODC records 
that in 2011, 20 persons (13 police and 7 farmers) were killed and 45 persons (40 police and 5 
farmers/tractor driver) were injured during the eradication operations.82 
With the decentralization of power to sub-national level, the security incidents would 
decrease. Local authorities possess a far better understanding of the specific actors and areas 
involved in insecure areas.  The ability to obtain information from local people on the 
movements of the Taliban and drug smugglers, or anti-government groups would provide 
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knowledge of when and where to promote eradication efforts, thereby reducing casualties. 
Most importantly, the sub-national level governments, unlike the central, can better coordinate 
the eradication campaigns with district shura of elders to gain their support.   
 With the current over-centralized approach of the central government, the eradication 
campaign is unsuccessful. The comparison between poppy cultivation and eradication from 
2002 to 2011 is well illustrated in the following chart. 
 
Figure 5: Comparison between opium poppy cultivation and eradication, 2002-2011 
 
As the chart demonstrates despite the prioritization of eradication as a counter-
narcotics strategy, the policy had little effect.  (According to the UNODC surveys, no figures 
were collect in 2002 and 2004.).83In fact, opium production increased in regions where 
eradication efforts were implemented. The eradication had best results in places where the 
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farmers had the chance of alternative livelihoods. Eradication can be successful only if 
accompanied by supplementary policies such as provision of alternative livelihoods and 
agricultural subsidies. The prioritization of areas for eradication should be decided by the sub-
national institutions for better results. 
2: Alternative Livelihoods 
 Alternative livelihood is another critical counter-narcotics approach in Afghanistan. In 
the words of Afghan counter narcotics minister, Zarar Ahmad Moqbil, the alternative livelihood 
program “ aims of providing alternative livelihood programs against poppy cultivation, 
improving agriculture economy and preventing farmers from resurgence.”84 This approach has 
been an important part of the overall counter-narcotics strategy of the Afghanistan 
government and its international allies since the very first efforts against illicit drugs production 
in Afghanistan.  Although it has been considered the most useful tool to prevent farmers from 
cultivating opium, the experts question it.According to Mansfield and Pain, “there are 
unrealistic expectations of how and when alternative livelihoods can be developed, and the 
concept remains a virtual one as the results of this approach are yet to be seen. The push by 
authorities for a sharp decline in opium-cultivated area is in danger of establishing a quid pro 
quo, with an expectation of funding for alternative livelihoods on the basis of achievements in 
decreasing opium poppy area. This puts the cart before the horse”.85 
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 The duo believes that there is confusion in understanding whether “Alternative 
livelihoods” is a means or the goal. So far, it has been considered as means for achieving 
national drug control strategy. It is assumed that by enhancing licit livelihood opportunities, 
cultivation of opium poppy will automatically contract. Theoretically it should be so, but 
practice and evidence from the field contradict it. The alternative livelihoods projects don’t 
provide enough income for the farmers to stop cultivating opium.86 Ali Ahmad Jalali, the former 
Interior Minister of Afghanistan, argues that from a purely economic perspective, there is no 
true alternative crop for Afghan farmers. On the other hand, wheat, the favorite substitute of 
foreign aid agencies to Afghan farmers, is not a viable source of income for farmers. The income 
from one hector cultivated opium is around $4,500 US dollars while the income from wheat 
cultivated in the same amount of land is only $500 US dollars. Farmers argue that wheat cannot 
provide sufficient income for them to lift their families out of poverty. Besides, the wheat 
imported from Pakistan is cheaper than produced domestically.87 
 Another problem lies in confusion over the timing of providing, alternative livelihoods, 
i.e., whether alternative livelihoods should be provided before or after the eradication of opium 
crops. Since the reasons for cultivating opium differ in different regions of the country, 
alternative livelihood might work as agricultural subsidies in some regions, but not in others.  It 
is therefore crucial to match the policies with the needs of the cultivators. This can only occur if 
local institutions and authorities have the authority to act accordingly – a power that they do 
not presently possess. As Mansfield has noted, too often the resource rich people of the 
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community who are less dependable on opium as a source of income received assistance while 
the poorest community members who are entirely dependent on opium benefited little from 
the alternative livelihoods projects. 88 Without an understanding of the cultivators motives, and 
the authority on the local level to implement the alternative livelihoods activities as needed, 
this policy as now administered by the central government, will continue to fail.  
3: Interdiction and Law Enforcement 
Interdiction of the opiates trade is also a top priority of the Afghan NDCS. The Afghan 
government argues that since traffickers are the backbones of the Afghan opium trade, it is 
more prudent to focus on them than the poor farmers who have little choice but to cultivate 
opium to feed their families. The US government supports the interdiction policy in Afghanistan 
financially and technically. The National Interdiction Unit (NIU) was established as an elite 
element of the CNPA. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of the US government 
supports the unit with provision of adviser and technical expertise. According to the State 
Department, the NIU, in 2008, was capable of conducting its own operations.89 The US 
government directly targeted those traffickers and opium traders who contribute to the 
insurgency in Afghanistan. The U.S. Department of Justice has indicted four high-value Afghan 
narco-traffickers with ties to the Taliban-led insurgency: Khan Mohammad, Haji Bashir Noorzai, 
Mohammad Essa, and Haji Baz 
Mohammad. 
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 According to the NDCS, “Over the past year or so Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF) 
and CN Police of Afghanistan’s (CNPA) operations have led to an increase in seizures and the CN 
Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) has, since May 2005, convicted over 150 traffickers”.90 
However, interdiction in today’s Afghanistan is very difficult for a variety of reasons. One of the 
mains reasons that interdiction fails in countries producing illicit drugs is the involvement of 
government officials. This too, is the most important reason that interdiction fails in 
Afghanistan and why the amount seized within and at the borders is insignificant.91 
 In regard to law enforcement, the prosecution of drug traders is beyond the capacity of 
Afghanistan’s current judicial system. The judicial system is weak, corrupt, ill equipped and 
trained, and unable to prosecute the drugs traders. Beside the above policies, some experts 
proposed alternative strategy of “Legalization of Afghan Opium” which has not been applied 
yet due to the rejection of the Afghan government and its international allies. 
4: Legalization of Afghan Illicit Drugs 
 Some experts, most notably the Sensil Council, an international policy think-tank, 
headquartered in London, have suggested that legalization of narcotics production in 
Afghanistan is the solution to the current illicit drug industry of this country. The proponents of 
this theory propose a variety of options, from providing cheap narcotics to Third World 
countries to buying the opium poppy crops and then destroying them.92 On the other hand, the 
majority of the analysts reject the legalization of Afghan illicit drugs production for various 
reasons.  According to Fredrec Grare, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
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Peace, the Senlis proposals would, on the contrary, speed up the transformation of Afghanistan 
into a narco-economy, by legitimizing the position of drug lords who holds power in 
Afghanistan. The Sensil proposals also fail to address the basic concern of the Afghan 
government and its international allies, the trafficking problem.93 
 More importantly, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy argues that the licensing of the illicit opium 
supply will not bring economic development to Afghanistan and its opium farmers for the 
simple fact that there is no demand for legal narcotics.  Four countries, China, India, Japan, and 
South Korea, currently meet the world’s need for opium poppies used in legal medications.94 
Countries  currently involved in legal production of opium for pharmaceutical use are Australia, 
Austria, China, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, India, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Macedonia, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom. On a practical level, no viable market exists for the tremendous amount of 
illicit drugs produced in Afghanistan. 
Perhaps most importantly, and as Ali Ahmad Jalali argues, such a proposal demonstrates 
a lack of understanding of the Afghan opium industry and political situation. The Afghan 
government is incapable of controlling production. It is beyond the capacity of the current 
Afghan government to control a dual system of opium production, featuring both licit and illicit 
production.  Existing corruption would further undermine the proposal as bribed officials would 
determine who could and could not grow the product legally. 
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Who do counter-narcotics policies fail? 
 In general, drug control policies fail for two reasons. First, they fail because of the profit 
paradox. The drugs industry is a huge profit generating industry. Drug mafias, traffickers, 
cultivators and producers earn billions of dollars annually.  When a government intercepts illicit 
drugs, prices of drugs increase. Governments assume that by increasing the cost of drugs 
through interdiction, fewer people will use drugs- a sort of demand reduction strategy. The flaw 
of this assumption is that with an increase in prices, more people are drawn into the drug 
business due to high profits.95 
 The second reason behind the failure of drug control policies is the hydra effect factor. 
Hydra effect implies that the drug industry has the ability of self-reproduction. Every time a 
government eliminates one source of drug production, processing, and smuggling, the traders 
will find an alternative supply. The removal of one drug cartel or syndicate creates a vacuum 
soon filled by a new group, eager to claim a share of the lucrative market.96 However, 
admittedly, if production moves outside Afghanistan that still would be good for Afghanistan. 
 It is also important to understand the role that drugs play within a country’s economy 
and political system. Some governments rely on the drug trade to indirectly increase their 
revenues, causing government officials to disregard pressure to prosecute drug traffickers. For 
example, 20 percent of the working force in Bolivia is illegally involved in drug production and 
trafficking, resulting in 70% of the gross national product (GDP) of the country. If this market is 
eliminated, widespread unemployment and violence will ensue. It is not surprising then, that 
the Bolivian government will not assist the US efforts to completely eliminate the drug 
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industry.97 In Afghanistan, UNODC estimated that 2.3 billion Afghans or 14% of the population 
are involved in opium cultivation and production. In 2004, the opium economy was worth $2.8 
billion US dollars, or 60% of the $4.5 billion legal economy.98 
The failure of counter-narcotics strategies in Afghanistan can be attributed to various 
reasons. The nature of opium industry in Afghanistan is very complex. Each policy’s failure, as 
discussed above, is caused by various factors. The most important of these, as this thesis 
argues, is the Afghan government’s over-centralized approach to counter narcotics. Additional 
failures include a lack of coordination among the Afghan institutions responsible for drug 
control, a lack of agreement and coordination between the Afghan government and its 
international allies regarding drug policies, insufficient resources for Afghan counter-narcotics 
forces, widespread drugs related corruption, and the corrupt judicial system. Some of the 
important flaws listed above can be fixed by changing to a decentralized approach in the war 
against narcotics in Afghanistan.  There are no silver-bullets, however, to tackle the Afghan 
opium problem. It is a long term process that needs a stronger commitment. 
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Chapter Five 
Way forward 
The complex nature of the Afghan illicit drug industry makes it unrealistic to claim there 
can be a silver bullet or a few changes to obtain short-term sustainable reduction. It will be, as 
stated earlier, a long-term, complex, and difficult struggle. The policies employed to curb illicit 
opium and other illicit drugs in Afghanistan are the policies mostly used as counter-narcotics 
strategies in different parts of the world. The effectiveness of these policies depends on the 
approach and structure of implementation. Neither eradication and alternative livelihoods, nor 
interdiction and law enforcement policies can achieve desirable results alone but, must be 
implemented simultaneously. The most important key to a successful implementation of these 
policies is to decentralize the approach by transferring the decision-making power over 
counter-narcotics efforts to the sub-national level where local authorities with their 
understanding of the complex nature of factors on the ground can best target and implement 
various measures more effectively. 
 Given the Afghan government’s centralized approach, the central agencies, such as the 
MCN, MoI, CNPA, NIU, Counter Narcotics Special Force (CNSF) and other institutions 
responsible for formulating, coordinating, supervising, and implementing policies have sought 
little input or advice from sub-national governments. The result has been a failure of success in 
controlling the Afghan drug problem. Subsequently, this thesis argues that decentralizing the 
authority over drug policies is necessary to achieve a reduction in the cultivation and 
production of illicit drugs.  Local governing bodies must be given more power in counter-
narcotics efforts with governors at the provincial level taking the lead.  
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 To supports this argument, this chapter addresses three main questions. First, what is 
meant by “decentralization of power”? Second, how should decentralization of power be 
defined in the Afghan context? Finally, why will the change to a decentralization of power over 
counter narcotic policies achieve more positive results in Afghanistan’s war against illicit drugs?  
1: Decentralization of power 
There are many definitions for “decentralization of power”. Two common definitions 
that capture the meaning as used in this thesis are as follows.  The decentralization of power is 
the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and resource utilization and allocation 
from central government to (a) field units of central government ministries or agencies; (b) 
subordinate units or level of central governments; (c) semi-autonomous public authorities or 
corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities.99 Another useful definition is; any 
act by which a central government formally cedes power to actors and institutions at lower 
levels in political and administrative territorial hierarchy.100 The common theme in both 
definitions is a decentralization of power includes the transfer of power and resources away 
from the central government.101 
 The use of decentralizing power as a tool or strategy of more effective governing 
appeared in the 1980s. Dull economies and inefficient central bureaucracies led researchers to 
search for alternatives, especially as governing solutions for problems in developing countries. 
There were domestic pressures for decentralization too. Local politician and civil society actors 
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sought to gain power and resources as a means of obtaining support from local allies or 
meeting demands for democratization.102 
 The movement in recent decades towards decentralizing governmental authority is 
grounded in the belief that doing so will increase government responsiveness and 
accountability to citizens in general, and will improve government flexibility to address the 
diverse needs of specific groups. This thesis argues that as the reasons for opium production 
and cultivation in Afghanistan are highly diverse, with farmers in different provinces cultivating 
opium for different reasons, only a decentralized approach will work.  Approaches to 
combatting opium production must have the flexibility to address the various reasons and 
causes.  In addition, decentralization can reduce corruption through enhanced oversight and 
provide a greater checks and balances in government institutions. This in turn makes 
governments more accountable, providing greater legitimacy. Governments that are viewed as 
more responsible and accountable imbue their citizens with a greater sense of citizen 
ownership of their government.103 
 Opponents, on the other hand, argue that decentralization of power increases the risks 
of ethnic and civil strives. They believe loosening the authority of the central government will 
trigger demands for greater autonomy rather than building stronger senses of ownership.  
Critics believe that decentralized authority accentuate differences between regions and fosters 
demand for particularized services by minority groups. Decentralization of power, according to 
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critics, encourages local politicians to take hardline position in defense of regional priorities 
over national interests.104 
 The decentralization literature has identified three major types of power sharing 
arrangements between center and sub-national governments – devolution, de-concentration, 
and delegation.  
1. Devolution: is the creation of increased reliance upon sub-national tiers of elected 
government, with some degree of political autonomy, which is substantially outside the 
direct control of the central government, yet subject to general policies and laws such as 
those regarding to civil rights and rule of law. This is considered the most expansive 
form of decentralization of power. 
2. De-concentration: is the transfer of power to an administrative unit of the central 
government at the field or regional office level. Local official are typically not elected, 
but appointed by the central government. This is considered a limited type of 
decentralization as the central government still retains control of resources and 
priorities.  This type of decentralization exists in a very weak form in Afghanistan 
3. Delegation: is the transfer of managerial responsibility for a specifically defined function 
outside the usual central government structure. Depending on how implemented, 
delegation could represent widely different aims. It could be the aim to build the 
capacity of local government officials in preparation for a move toward devolution. In 
this sense, it would be a starting point for decentralization. However, it could also be 
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that the central government would maintain the status quo, while claiming to be sharing 
governance with sub-national governance.  
Decentralization of power typically proceeds along three dimension of central-local power 
sharing- Political, Fiscal, and Administrative.  
1. Political: political decentralization is the transfer of political authority to the local 
level through the establishment of elected local government, electoral reform, 
political party reform, authorization of participatory processes, and other reforms. 
There is no political decentralization of power in Afghanistan.  Almost all sub-
national governments are appointed by the center.   
2. Fiscal: fiscal decentralization is the transfer of financial authority to the sub-national 
tiers of the government. In includes reducing conditions of the inter-governmental 
transfer of resources and giving local jurisdictions greater authority to generate their 
own revenues. Sub-national levels of institutions in Afghanistan have no fiscal 
autonomy. Their budget is determined by the center through line ministries.   
3. Administrative: administrative decentralization is the full or partial transfer of 
functional responsibilities to the local tiers of government.105 This is the form of 
decentralization in Afghanistan, with the powers of the local administrations 
determined by the center. The bureaucrats are appointed by the center. Local 
institutions are not accountable to the provincial governor but to the line ministries 
in Kabul.  The result of this structure is weak coordination, ineffective delivery of 
services by the local authorities, and a long and corrupt bureaucracy.   
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Countries around the globe, depending upon their needs and policies, have adopted differing 
decentralization arrangements. The effectiveness of decentralization of power depends of the 
pre-existing conditions of the state. Societies respond to decentralization of power differently. 
No type of decentralization of power can generate the same results in all societies. 
2: Decentralization of power in Afghanistan 
For the purpose of this thesis, decentralization of power in Afghanistan is defined as:  
the transfer of decision-making power from the center in regard to counter-narcotics planning, 
implementing, and management to sub-national level- governors.  As discussed, Afghanistan 
possesses one of the most highly centralized governmental structures in existence.   This view is 
supported by Manning et al in A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, whowrite that although 
the current decentralization of power in Afghanistan comes closest to the de-concentration 
arrangement of administrative dimension, 106 even on this scale, the formal control of Kabul 
over day-to-day administrative decisions appears highly centralized.  
 Manning et al, do suggest that once provincial and district councils elections are held as 
provided for in the 2004 constitution, Afghanistan may become closer to a “delegation” model 
over the time107.  This argument is not persuasive for two important reasons.  Even once 
elected, neither the provincial and district level councils will possess executive powers, nor 
does the central power have plans to transfer such authority to the councils. According to the 
Afghan constitution, those councils are advisory, possessing only the authority to advise the 
provincial administrations on certain issues.  They are to remain advisory boards without 
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executive powers.108The following table explains the center-local formal relationship in 
Afghanistan.  
Formal Local-Central relationship in Afghanistan 
 Administrative Arrangements  Fiscal Arrangements’  
 Structure  Personnel  Structure  Personnel  
P
ro
vi
n
ce
 
The departmental 
structure mirrors the 
ministry structure in 
Kabul-although not all 
ministries have 
corresponding 
departments.   
The governors approves 
junior staff appointments 
and transfers (staff of 
grade 6 and below and agir 
staff at grade 3 and below), 
the relevant ministries 
approve the staff of from 
grade 3-5, and senior staff 
(grade 2 and above) are 
appointed by the president.  
All tax and customs 
level are set by central 
government statute. All 
revenues are collected 
on behalf of Kabul. 
Subsequent fiscal 
transfers to the 
province are made as 
per line department 
budget allocations. 
Actual cash transfers 
reflect the difference.  
The “ordinary” and 
development budget 
allocations for the 
provinces are the sum 
total of the 
administrative 
decisions made by the 
various Kabul ministries 
concerning the 
allocations to their 
provincial departments 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
The structure mirrors the 
departmental structure in 
the province- although 
not all departments have 
corresponding units in 
districts.  
The governors approves 
junior staff appointments 
and transfers (staff of 
grade 6 and all agir staff ), 
the relevant ministries 
approves staff from grade 
3-6) and the senior staff 
such as Woleswal and 
judges are appointed by 
the president.  
Districts collect minor 
business taxes; rates are 
reviewed by a review 
committee of district 
and provincial 
representatives every 
three year. Revenues 
are remitted to the 
province.  
The “ordinary” and 
development budget 
allocations for the 
districts are the sum 
total of the 
administrative 
decisions made by the 
various provincial 
departments 
concerning the 
allocations to their 
districts sub-
departments.  
P
ro
vi
n
ci
al
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y 
The municipality 
structure (departments 
and number of staff) is 
set by the Ministry of 
Interior, with agreement 
of governor. 
The governors approves 
junior staff appointments 
and transfers (staff of 
grade 6 and below and agir 
staff at grade 3 and below), 
the relevant ministries 
approve the staff of from 
grade 3-5, and senior staff 
(grade 2 and above) are 
appointed by the president. 
All taxes and fee rates 
are set in Kabul. 
Revenues remain in the 
municipality and fund 
all municipality 
expenditure.  
The “ordinary” and 
development budget 
allocations for the 
provincial municipality 
are processed by the 
municipality and 
approved by the 
Ministry of Interior 
(Municipalities General 
Presidency) with the 
agreement of governor.  
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R
u
ra
l M
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y 
The structure is set by the 
Ministry of Interior with 
the agreement of 
Provincial municipality 
and governor.  
These are district staff, 
there the governor 
approves junior staff 
appointments and transfers 
(staff from grade 6 and 
below and all agir staff), 
the relevant ministries 
approve the staff of from 
grade 3-5, and senior staff 
(grade 2 and above) are 
appointed by the president. 
All taxes and fee rates 
are set in Kabul. 
Revenues remain in the 
municipality and fund 
all municipality 
expenditure 
No formal budgetary 
allocations are made 
apart from salary 
payments. 
Development budget 
expenditures are 
agreed ad hoc and 
administered by the 
municipality.  
Table 2: Central-Local Administrations Relationships in Afghanistan109 
As the chart above clearly illustrates, the central government is in absolute control of 
day-to-day decision making for all tiers of government in Afghanistan. The central government 
appoints all officials from governor to the mid-level authorities. More importantly, each 
provincial ministerial department answers not to the local governor, but to the central ministry. 
To improve counter narcotic effectiveness, each governor, the highest level of sub-national 
authority, should wield direct authority over the war against drugs. Similarly, local institutions 
should be answerable to their respective governors, and be given responsibility for 
coordinating, planning and implementing local drug policies. 
 The Afghan Constitution grants the President the authority to appoint all governors, 
considered presidential representative at the provincial level.  Although given the authority to 
coordinate all provincial institutions, governors in fact may not appoint or dismiss staff without 
approval of the central government. This arrangement frustrates the efficient implementation 
of drug policies and must be changed to provide governors with concrete authority in this area.   
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3: Why decentralization of power? 
 As discussed in Chapter three and four, the Afghan opium industry is highly decentralized 
and diverse, with 90 to 98% of cultivation and production of opium taking place in rural areas 
and more than 90 percent occurring at the district and village levels. The argument that an 
effective and sustainable reduction of cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan 
requires a decentralize approach, is supported by the following sub-arguments. 
1: Successful Cases 
 As the following discussion shows, the only effective reductions of opium cultivation and 
production in Afghanistan has occurred in the two provinces of Nangarhar and Balkh,  located 
in eastern and northern Afghanistan respectively.  What sets these two provinces apart is that 
strategies were both formulated and implemented at the provincial or governor’s level.  Even 
more useful to the analysis is the fact that Nangarhar is located in an insecure part of the 
country, while Balkh is located in a comparatively stable part. 
(A)-Nangarhar:In 2003 and 2004, according to the UNODC surveys, Nangarhar province was 
the largest producer of opium in Afghanistan, contributing 23% and 24% of the total production 
in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Almost every district in the province cultivated opium poppy. In 
2005, the UNODC declared Nangarhar province an almost “poppy free” province, a term used 
for provinces cultivating less than 100 hectors of opium poppy. In 2005, Nangarhar cultivated 
only 1,093 hector of land compared to 28,213 hector in 2004 – a 96% decrease. The credit for 
this drastic decrease in poppy production, according to UNODC, goes to the governor of the 
province. With a weak central government in power, the governor initiated his own efforts to 
curb poppy production in his province. When asked why they did not grow poppies, the 
62 
 
majority of farmers responded:   the governor’s promise to eradicate our fields, threats of law 
enforcement and imprisonment, and the governor’s promise to provide alternative legal 
livelihoods and agricultural subsidies. As a part of his policy, the governor, before the 2004-5 
growing season, informed the district authorities that they would be held responsible for the 
level of opium poppy cultivation in their areas. The district level authorities, on their part, called 
the tribal elders and the shura (elders’ council) from each village to the district center and 
informed them that they should not cultivate poppy in their areas. A complete decentralized 
approach was initiated.  Hence, because of the governor’s open hands in initiating his own 
policy, the province experienced this dramatic decrease. Until today, Nangarhar because of this 
one solid action remains amongst the lowest cultivating provinces.110 
(B)- Balkh: Another successful case is the Balkh province in northern Afghanistan. Balkh from 
2004 until 2006 was amongst the top 5 opium poppy cultivating provinces. In 2005 Balkh 
cultivated 8,342 hectors of opium and in 2006 7,100 hectors of land.  In 2007, the UNODC 
recorded zero hector of cultivation, a 100 percent decreased compared to 2007. The reports 
attributed the success to the effective leadership and incentives of provincial authorities, 
especially the governor that led farmers to turn their back on opium.  The report ended with 
the recommendation that other provinces adopt policies similar to those of Balkh province. The 
Balkh provincial governor, another de facto111 powerful governor and former Mujahideen 
commander, policies were based on successful pre-cultivating campaign, eradication, 
                                                          
110 UNODC 
111I used the term de facto powerful governor in the sense that some governors because of their past strong 
political and military status have more powers, of course illegal, than their other counterparts in the country. 
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interdiction, law enforcement, and alternative livelihood provision.112 Because of this effective 
decentralized approach, this province remains poppy free today. The success achieved in these 
two provinces supports the argument that transferring authority to the governors in the war 
against drugs in Afghanistan increases the chances for sustainable reduction of illicit drugs.   
2: The decentralized and diverse nature of Afghan opium Industry 
 Given the diverse nature of the Afghan opium industry, a successful opium reduction 
program must incorporate differentiated approaches that are designed to accommodate a 
variety of factors including population needs, climatic conditions, level of agricultural 
infrastructure, and political realities. While programs initiated at the governors’ level achieved 
drastic reductions in Nangarhar and Balkh provinces, the 96% reduction between 2006 and 
2008 in the Badakhshan province resulted from a severe two-year drought. In areas where 
farmers had no access to irrigation and were dependent on rain, poppies were the only possible 
crop and the only way that people had to feed their families.  But, in villages where irrigation 
was available, the UNODC reported, no opium cultivation was observed.  The fact that villages 
which had irrigation facility did not grow opium poppy demonstrates that when provided with 
agricultural assistance such as irrigation, fertilized seeds, and other help, , people will turn their 
back on opium.  
Kunduz, as the map above indicates, is a northern province and a major contributor of 
opium in 2004-2006, was declared poppy free in 2007.  The achievement of this status was not 
due to eradication, interdiction, or drought, but to the provision of alternative agricultural 
subsidies. Kunduz is the leading example of a province where farmers willingly changed from 
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poppy production to the cultivation of vegetables, fruit, and cotton. For such a diverse and 
decentralized face of the Afghan opium industry, the current highly centralized approach can 
never be effective.   
Given the ability of provincial governors to understand the problems of their regions 
more accurately, the authority to craft appropriate and effective policies and implementation 
programs must be transferred to the provincial levels. As Governor Gulab Mangal of Helmand 
province, the largest opium producing province, has stressed, the center should not tie our 
hands.  We must be free to formulate policies in accordance with the realities that we have.  
Applying blanket eradication and alternative livelihoods situations programs that do not take 
into account the various needs of villages and families is not only a waste of effort, but also a 
waste of scarce resources. He further argues that while eradication in one village may be 
appropriate, another village may benefit more from an alternative livelihood program.113 
 On the other hand, an Afghan expert in a personal discussion with the author, argues 
that the problem lies not in the approach but in the willingness, honesty, and transparency of 
the authorities in the war against drugs. Highly critical of the government, he believes that 
current institutions involved in counter-narcotics efforts, including MCN, MIA, Provincial 
governors, security commanders, and many other high and low level personnel and institutions, 
are promoting the cultivation and production of opium rather than curbing it. He argues that 
the power, be it in center or sub-national level, will change nothing unless the authorities 
involved in narcotics trade change themselves for the better. When asked about the solution, 
he suggests that the international forces and countries should take more active part in counter-
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narcotics efforts. The international forces should help in prosecuting high level Afghan 
government officials, which according to him are involved in drugs trade. For him, currently, 
almost all counter-narcotics institutions and personnel starting from the ministerial level to 
provincial governors and field level policeman are involved in this trade.  In his words “How can 
we expect the police force currently fighting against drugs to be effective, while 20% of the 
force is narcotics addicts?”114 While I do agree that there is corruption involved and serious 
steps should be taken to fight it, I do not agree with his generalized statements about the 
problem.  
 Taking into account the diversity and decentralization of opium cultivation and 
production in Afghanistan, the centralistic approach of the government will not help the 
situation. Current central government’s institutions are incapable of effectively addressing the 
problem from the center. In simple words, it is beyond the capability of the central government 
to address this issue. The center needs to involve the sub-national units more actively with 
proper authority. The policies formulated and implemented by the center are not only 
ineffective, but counter-productive. Thus, the approach should be decentralized and powers 
should be transferred from center to sub-national level in this regard to respond effectively to 
the problem.  
3: Coordination and cooperation 
 Several institutions of the Afghan government and its international allies are involved in 
the war against illicit drugs in Afghanistan.  Afghan institutional departments include:  MCN 
MoI, MoD, CNPA, Ministry of Agriculture, ANA, ANP, and etc. Most of these institutions have 
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agencies represented at the provincial and even district levels. International agencies include 
DEA (US), UNODC, Department of State (US), Afghan Drugs Inter Departmental Unit (ADIDU) of 
Britain, etc. These institutions vary from ministerial level to departmental, NGOs, and 
institutions of foreign governments. The level further goes from central to provincial and even 
district level. For the most part, each institution and agency possesses its own set of 
regulations, responsibilities, and framework, with little cooperation and coordination among 
any of the various institutions either vertically or horizontally. The Law on Narcotics, signed by 
the president Karzai on 17th December, 2005, delegates primary responsibility to supervise, 
manage, and monitor counter narcotics efforts to the Ministry of Counter Narcotics.  Other 
important governmental agencies also possess responsibilities over counter narcotic efforts 
leading to a confusion of responsibilities, authority, and conflicting agendas.  Included among 
these agencies are the Narcotics deputy ministerial office of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, 115 
and several agencies within the police forces including the Counter Narcotics Police of 
Afghanistan and the Counter Narcotics Special forces (police), and specific eradication police 
units. 
 The same bureaucratic problems of competing agendas, policies, and programs and lack 
of coordination and cooperation encountered at the central level are mirrored on the provincial 
level. As the Helmand governor says, the level of coordination that he has in his province is not 
available in central institutions.  The greater the bureaucratic confusion, the more opportunity 
exists for corruption.   An example of this, according to the Helmand provincial governor, is 
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their six year long wait for a $1 million grant from the United States in recognition of their 
successes in overall stabilization of the province.116 
 Afghanistan has 34 provinces and majority of them cultivate and produce opium. It is 
beyond the capacity of the central government with so many institutions and no cooperation 
and coordination to curb the illicit drugs. Hence, the transfer of power to sub-national level 
would decrease the size of administrative structure in general. Thus, a better and effective 
decentralized approach would make it easier to achieve better coordination and cooperation if 
the sub-national level departments of the line ministries are responsible to the governor, not 
the center in regard to counter-narcotics efforts. Each provincial governor will have better 
coordination with the soldiers of each NATO member country based in their province-another 
positive achievement of decentralized approach. 
 To conclude, with the huge size, decentralized nature, and diverse face of Afghan opium 
industry, there is a fundamental need to change the current centralistic approach. A decade is 
enough time for this current approach to have proven its effectiveness. It is the time to switch 
to a better, effective, and realistic decentralized approach in order to achieve desirable 
sustainable reduction and see Afghanistan opium free.   
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Conclusion 
 Poppy cultivation and production, trafficking and consumption of opium are legitimate 
threats and challenges to numerous interests. In the first place, to Afghanistan the opium 
industry is a destabilizing, dangerous, and highly corrupting illicit trade that undermines the 
developing foundation for democratization, development, and state rebuilding. For The US and 
international community involved in Afghanistan, the opium trade is an important factor in 
fueling and extending insurgency. The various policies applied to date have produced not 
positive results. As mentioned earlier, these policies have been used successfully in many 
countries.  Their failure in Afghanistan lies in the government’s approach to implementing the 
policies. It’s highly centralized and opposite to the decentralized, diverse, and complex nature 
of the Afghan opium industry. The decentralized approach proposed in this thesis, relies on 
flexibility and is the best fit to effectively fight the current anti-drugs war. The approach is line 
with the long-term goal of development and democratization in the diverse and highly 
heterogeneous society and geography of Afghanistan.  
 At the general level, as supplementary recommendations and critical to the success of 
approach and the war against illicit opium industry of Afghanistan, the Afghan government and 
its international allies should seriously consider the following points. 
1: Security is the pre-condition for any strategy and approach to be successful. For improving 
security the following points are recommended: 
 Increased military presence in insecure areas with the Afghan security forces in lead to 
avoid undesirable mistakes that could spark mass anger and strikes. 
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 Major roads and highways, critical to the opium trade and connecting famers to the 
markets, must be secured by specialized patrolling forces 
 Increased military presence on Afghanistan-Central Asia, and Afghanistan-Pakistan  
borders with a vigilant eye on opium traders and traffickers  
 Afghan and international security forces in each province should be mobilized to disrupt 
trafficking networks in addition to their counter-insurgency mission. 
 Avoid cultural and religious insensitivity to local tradition by letting Afghan security 
forces lead raids and operations 
 Provide employment for the unemployed bulk of the youths, a highly vulnerable 
segment of the population recruited by insurgents because of poverty and 
unemployment. 
2:Corruption is another major obstacle in the war against drugs. Drug-related corruption is as 
wide spread as any other corruption. Though corruption is as huge of a problem as the drug 
industry itself and out of the scope of this thesis to address, the following points are 
recommended: 
 Punishing the corrupt and rewarding the honest officials is a must. 
 Rehabilitating the judicial system is crucial to a successful implementation of the 
punishing and rewarding principle. 
  Increasing the security forces’ salaries is certainly helpful, especially forces directly 
involved in counter-narcotics efforts. 
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 Involving the international community to pressure the Afghan government in 
prosecuting high level authorities involved in corruption, especially drug-related 
corruption. 
 Establishment of a highly trained anti-corruption force, civil and military, in the 
structure of the government. 
 In the general context, the growth of the licit economy is a crucial part in combatting 
corruption. 
3:Rule of law is another major contributor in tackling the illicit opium cultivation and 
production. Central and sub-national levels of law enforcement bodies are incapable, corrupt, 
and weak to enforce the law. Some recommendations for overcoming the rule of law issue, 
especially in regard to counter-narcotics are as follow: 
 The international community, especially the US should become more directly involved in 
prosecuting traffickers and traders, while simultaneously building Afghan judicial 
system.  
 Increasing Afghan-international community partnership for justice sector reforms. 
Increasing assistance and training of prosecutors, especially in counter-narcotics 
investigating, prosecuting, and interdicting personnel. 
 Removing and prosecuting high level authorities of the law enforcement bodies 
incapable of law enforcement and involved in breaking law. 
 Establishing a civil service academy to recruit highly educated youths in the civil 
administrations.  
 Establishing a highly transparent and effective approach for recruiting police and Army. 
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 Increases in salary and the overall licit economic growth is yet again a crucial part of 
Rule of law.  
4: There are no short-term silver bullets. Afghanistan has had two decades of being highly 
active in the cultivation and production of illicit opium. For millions of people it’s the only 
source of income to feed their families.  Changing to a licit income source will take time. 
Pressing for quick-fix strategies is not only useless, but counterproductive. It is a long-term 
struggle that needs strong commitment, sufficient resources, and active international 
involvement.   
 Implementing these highly critical, supportive, tactical, and strategic recommendations 
along with the decentralized approach will ensure that Afghancounter-narcotics efforts will be 
balanced with the counter-insurgency mission and democratization process. Utilizing this 
approach should ensure that Afghanistan will be transformed into a poppy freecountry or in the 
worst-case, a country where illicit production of opium and its derivates will not constitute a 
major threat and challenge. 
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